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Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to resolutions 1653 (2006) and 1663 (2006)

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 8 of resolution 1663 (2006), in which the Security Council, inter alia, recalled its request that I make proposals on how United Nations agencies and missions, in particular the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS), could more effectively address the problem of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

I. Background

2. Since it began in the mid-1980s, the conflict in northern Uganda has affected Kitgum, Gulu and Pader districts of "Acholiland", Lango subregion and, to a lesser extent, Teso subregion. For 20 years, northern Uganda has been known for the continuous violence unleashed on the people by LRA, which has resulted in human tragedy, chronic insecurity, lawlessness, serious human rights violations, marginalization and the impoverishment of vast segments of the population. In the 1990s, LRA was alleged to have moved its activities into southern Sudan and later, into the area of the Garamba National Park in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which borders on Western Equatoria state of the Sudan.

3. For two decades, LRA has inflicted enormous suffering, mostly on the Acholi community, the very ethnic group on whose behalf it claims to be fighting. It has caused the displacement of around 2 million people, the majority of whom fled within their own sub-counties, and 1.5 million of whom continue to live in seriously overcrowded camp settings. An estimated 100,000 people are reported to have died as a result of the prolonged conflict.

4. In contrast to the situation in the rest of the country, basic socio-economic indicators in the areas affected by LRA have worsened during the prolonged period of the conflict. Access to water, sanitation, health, justice and education is more restricted in northern Uganda than in other parts of the country, while indicators of poverty, environmental degradation and HIV/AIDS are higher. The population has been unable to engage in productive economic activities and, as a result, has become increasingly dependent on external aid. Throughout the years of the LRA insurgency, living conditions have considerably deteriorated, while opportunities for survival through traditional mechanisms have diminished.

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5. There is a lack of credible information on the strength and capacity of LRA. Although its forces are believed to have diminished over the past years, LRA remains active in the border regions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda and southern Sudan. Despite its reduced numbers, it presents a real threat to the rule of law and adds to the existing security problems in the Great Lakes region, which are compounded, inter alia, by the breakdown of local authority and law enforcement mechanisms. The extended period of breakdown in the rule of law and in the civilian administration of justice in the LRA-affected areas in northern Uganda, as well as excessive reliance on poorly trained armed forces, such as local defence units, has further exacerbated the security situation and undermined the trust of the population of northern Uganda in the will and ability of the Government of Uganda to protect them.

6. Given the high level of insecurity prevailing in the LRA-affected areas, it is often difficult to distinguish between LRA attacks and acts of banditry committed by disaffected armed elements and common criminals. It should be noted that attacks by LRA are at their lowest recorded levels in several years and there is evidence of its diminished military capacity.

7. While the exact strength of LRA is unknown, it appears to represent currently no more than several hundred active combatants, and does not seem to be a credible military force. However, it has a proven ability to regroup and continue committing atrocities. Furthermore, LRA remains a violent criminal group with a severe disruptive capacity against the civilian population within its reach, humanitarian convoys in the area and personnel of the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), UNMIS and other United Nations programmes, funds and agencies operating in the Great Lakes region. I share the view of the Security Council that, as such, LRA should be regarded as a threat to regional peace.

8. The United Nations has been deeply concerned about LRA activities. Efforts have been made to address them within existing capabilities and in strict compliance with the mandates of the United Nations programmes, agencies and missions operating in Uganda and in the Great Lakes region. Such efforts are carried out without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Uganda to protect civilians and address the challenges created by the criminal activities and the human rights abuses committed by LRA. In that regard, I was encouraged by the efforts of the Government of Uganda as reflected in its document concerning LRA (S/2006/271).

II. Implications of the activities of the Lord's Resistance Army

9. According to the Commission on Human Rights, the conflict in northern Uganda has been marked by gross abuses of human rights and continuous violations of international humanitarian law by all sides.

10. The fundamental rights to life, liberty and personal safety are among the most consistently violated. Throughout the two decades of its insurgency, LRA has made the civilian population the target of most of its activity. Although significantly reduced, LRA violence against civilians continues, including abductions of children and adults, extrajudicial killings and sexual and gender-based violence, mostly rape and torture. Human rights violations by the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF) and their auxiliary forces also continue to be reported. Irregular salary

payments to the Government security forces, in particular the local defence units referred to as the "Arrow Boys" in Teso and "Amuka" in Lango, have also contributed to abuses. The majority of these cases are not reported because of fear of reprisals, lack of concrete evidence and distrust of the existing judicial system. However, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) is currently investigating a number of such cases alleging abuses against civilians by security forces. One of the most alarming facts of life for civilians in the LRA-affected areas is the widespread use of torture. Former LRA abductees regularly speak of mistreatment during captivity, including severe beating and physical and psychological torture. Several reports of abuse have also been obtained from civilians detained by the security forces.

11. In 1996, the Government initiated, as a temporary measure, the displacement of the civilian population into protected camps in "Acholiland", to ensure their safety against the LRA incursions and, most important, to protect children from abductions. Ten years later, the internally displaced population remains in over 200 camps, under curfew and with limited freedom of movement within a designated security perimeter around the camp. In addition, civilian policing and judicial institutions are weak and sometimes non-existent in the remote rural areas of northern Uganda. Their accessibility is extremely limited for security, logistical and economic reasons. Numerous civilians interviewed in recent years by human rights observers have also questioned their impartiality.

12. The duration and conditions of encampment of the internally displaced persons present a unique challenge to the enjoyment of rights. The inability of the displaced to participate in decisions regarding their own future and to make an informed judgement, especially about security risks at their places of origin, has been a serious concern.

13. The conflict in northern Uganda has also transformed traditional gender roles in households and communities. The role of men in the family has been undermined, but the traditional tasks of women have remained unchanged. Additionally, in some cases, women are assuming the role of heads of household. More than a quarter of households in the camps for internally displaced persons in northern Uganda are headed by women. There is an increasing sense of frustration, especially on the part of the male population, which can no longer protect families, and this frustration often turns into anger and increased domestic violence against women.

14. Women and girls in the LRA-affected areas have been subjected to various forms of sexual and gender-based violence such as rape, forced marriage, enslavement, killings, torture, mutilation and starvation. Approximately 1,000 girls have returned from the bush with children conceived by LRA males. In addition to abuses by LRA, women are also reportedly harassed by Government security forces. Lack of civilian police trained in addressing sexual violence and exploitation, an inadequate legal framework, the absence of medical and psychological prevention and support services, and social barriers explain the reluctance of the victims to report violence of a sexual nature. Furthermore, reporting and referral mechanisms for women and girls are non-existent in internally displaced persons camps and, in rape cases, the absence of Government health facilities authorized to issue the legally required medical certificate to the victim is a significant obstacle to reporting and investigations.

15. Children continue to be the victims of violence and abuse by LRA in northern Uganda and southern Sudan. Neither the Government of Uganda nor the communities and families can protect their children against the horrible violence perpetrated by LRA. Despite a significant reduction in 2005 and 2006, child abductions by LRA continue to take place. On the other hand, the number of children and young people escaping from LRA has also significantly declined. There were 57 new arrivals in reception centres in April 2006, compared to 727 in April 2004. Initially, the phenomenon of "night commuting" among children was a response to LRA abductions. More recently, the motivation of children walking long distances on a daily basis to find safe haven has become more complex and is often related to the lack of protection within dysfunctional family structures. It is estimated that 20,000 abductees of all ages have returned home. However, the conflict has ruptured the social fabric. Its most appalling ramification is the failure of the families and the communities to reabsorb former abductees and children born in captivity.

16. Illiteracy, malnutrition and diseases are also prevalent among children, particularly in the internally displaced persons camps. There is a lack of basic social amenities and infrastructure, which has made the quality of life in the camps deplorable. Not surprisingly, the mortality rate is well above the emergency threshold in camps across northern Uganda.

17. The activities of LRA have hampered the efforts by the international community to respond to natural and man-made disasters in the region. Humanitarian operations, particularly efforts to reach the population in need in northern Uganda and southern Sudan, have been seriously affected. Vast swathes of the LRA-affected areas lack critical health-care systems, including provision of basic service and vaccinations. Return and reintegration of the returnees could be supported only in a spontaneous manner.

III. Assessment of United Nations missions and capabilities

A. United Nations Mission in the Sudan

18. UNMIS has been deployed with the objective of supporting the parties in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 9 January 2005. In the security area, the Mission's current mandate is limited by resolution 1590 (2005) to the following tasks:

(a) To observe and monitor the movement of Sudanese armed groups and the redeployment of forces in the areas of UNMIS deployment in accordance with the ceasefire agreement;

(b) To help establish the necessary security conditions, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, for the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons and for humanitarian assistance;

(c) Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, to take necessary action, in the areas of its deployment and as it deems within its capabilities and without prejudice to the responsibility of the Sudanese authorities, to protect United Nations and other personnel, including civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.

19. With such a mandate, UNMIS operates with the usual Chapter VI force composition and configuration and has very few robust assets at its disposal. The military component is structured to provide support and security for monitoring and verification of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, rather than to conduct operations which may require an offensive capability. Further, the 700 UNMIS soldiers spread thinly in 10 locations throughout Equatoria — an area the size of Austria — are essentially deployed to provide protection to United Nations installations and personnel and military escort to United Nations military observers and logistics, mine clearance, contingent-owned equipment and humanitarian convoys. The sector's air assets are currently limited to three transport helicopters, which do not have an attack capability. The aviation unit for that sector, which will provide additional transport capacity, is still arriving in the Mission area.

20. In resolution 1663 (2006), the Council urged UNMIS to "make full use of its current mandate and capabilities" against LRA. The present configuration of UNMIS allows the Mission to undertake regular patrolling by military observers, in known LRA areas. These patrols are escorted by small protection elements which, due to their size, scope and mandate, are limited to carrying out a minimum defensive capability.

21. It should also be recalled that the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (section 12 of the permanent ceasefire protocol) expressly states that the parties to the Agreement would assume full responsibility for dealing with foreign armed groups. Any robust operation against LRA or other foreign armed groups within the UNMIS operational area would need to be agreed upon with the parties to the Agreement. Such an activity would require an expanded mandate, but also an enhanced configuration of forces and more robust assets, specialized equipment and real-time intelligence.

22. With regard to the LRA threat in the Equatoria region of southern Sudan, UNMIS initiated in August 2005 an informal arrangement which has allowed it to meet regularly with the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) to liaise and share information collected by the United Nations military observe, patrols. Weekly joint coordination meetings are held with both military organizations. As UNMIS becomes fully deployed in Equatoria, it will be in a position to further enhance intramission information-sharing and develop a consistent approach to dealing with the LRA issue, including in its security, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and related puolic information aspects. The Mission will also enhance its capacity to share information with MONUC and with the United Nations country team in Uganda on the LRA matters relevant to those parties. UNMIS also meets regularly with Ugandan diplomats and the UPDF coordination office in Juba.

23. As provided for in the memorandum of understanding between the Governments of the Sudan and Uganda, which also includes the Government of Southern Sudan, UPDF operates in Equatoria against LRA, and is backed by air support. However, the memorandum of understanding expired earlier this year and has not yet been renewed. The combined strength of the SAF, SPLA and UPDF military presence in the Equatoria region is estimated at 50,000 personnel. By comparison, UNMIS has around 700 troops and a small reserve capacity.

24. Overall, the LRA threat is one aspect of general insecurity in Equatoria. There have been a number of attacks allegedly perpetrated by LRA since the start of 2006.

It should be noted, however, that it is difficult to distinguish between LRA attacks and acts of banditry committed by non-LRA elements in the area. On 19 March, a group of some 80 to 150 armed individuals, believed to be LRA elements, attacked four installations in the town of Yambio, near the Sudanese border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo, engaging the small 37-strong Bangladeshi contingent. At the same time, they raided locations of non-governmental organizations in search of communications equipment and supplies. Following the recent deterioration of the security situation, UNMIS has restricted movements without armed escort in southern Sudan, which has obviously affected the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees and has had a very negative impact on the lives of southern Sudanese.

25. UNMIS has no mandate to arrest and can only detain individuals who attack, or threaten to attack, United Nations personnel or installations or local populations within the immediate vicinity of United Nations installations. The capabilities of that particular United Nations mission to provide protection should be also taken into account. Detainees would have to be immediately handed over to the Sudanese authorities. While the Sudan is not a State party to the Rome Statute, it has signed a memorandum of understanding with the International Criminal Court pledging to hand over the indicted LRA leaders to The Hague.

B. United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

26. Apart from its deadly attack on MONUC personnel that resulted in casualties among MONUC peacekeepers, including eight fatalities, in January 2006, LRA appears to be inactive in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. There are indications that following the redeployment to the Democratic Republic of the Congo of a group headed by Commander Vincent Otti, other LRA leaders may be relocating to Garamba National Park and the border area between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and southern Sudan, seeking a safe haven. It is also believed that Joseph Kony is currently in the same area, although he was reported to be in southern Sudan in May 2006. His presence in southern Sudan may explain the alleged LRA attack on the outskirts of the city of Juba in June 2006, which killed nine civilians.

27. Through resolution 1565 (2004) and subsequent resolutions, MONUC is mandated, inter alia, to use force to deter attacks that could threaten the political process and to ensure the protection of civilians. Acting in support of the Government of National Unity and Transition of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it should also assist the Congolese authorities in the maintenance of order; contribute to the improvement of the security conditions in which humanitarian assistance is provided; support operations of the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) to disarm foreign combatants; contribute to the successful completion of the electoral process by assisting in the establishment of a secure environment for free, transparent and peaceful elections; assist in the promotion and protection of human rights; and continue to cooperate with efforts to ensure that those responsible for serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law are brought to justice.

28. As the elections approach, the highest operational priority will have to be accorded to promoting a secure environment for the electoral process. This task will

temporarily limit the extent to which MONUC assets could be dedicated to pursuing foreign armed groups such as LRA, which is not assessed as being able to disrupt the electoral process in a major way. It should be recalled that security in the Democratic Republic of the Congo continues to suffer from thousands of Mayi-Mayi groups terrorizing the population in Katanga, thousands of troops of the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda doing the same in the Kivus and the activities of rogue armed groups in Ituri. Protecting and ensuring the security of the population in those areas remains a very challenging task for FARDC and MONUC, with the limited capacity available to them.

29. In this connection, the MONUC military presence near Garamba National Park has been redeployed to Bunia to resume military operations against the remnants of the Ituri armed groups. MONUC operations in support of FARDC in LRA-affected areas of the Democratic Republic of the Congo will continue in the near future.

30. FARDC maintains a battalion close to Garamba National Park, which, according to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is adequate to deal with the LRA threat. MONUC is prepared to provide time-limited logistical support for operations, within its capacity.

31. MONUC is aware of its mandate to detain the LRA leaders who have been indicted by the International Criminal Court, and would seek to do so if it came across them while carrying out its mandated duties. The captured LRA leaders would have to be immediately handed over to the Congolese authorities who, since the Democratic Republic of the Congo is a State party to the Rome Statute and has other agreements with the Court, would then be expected to hand over the suspects for arraignment in The Hague. As mentioned above, joint FARDC-MONUC operations against foreign armed groups, including LRA, will continue insofar as the MONUC capacity and mandate allow.

IV. Observations

32. The implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in southern Sudan enhances the opportunity for peace in northern Uganda. However, peace will not provide all answers to the challenges created during two decades of conflict. Greater efforts by all concerned are required to address the root causes of the conflict in northern Uganda. Building mutual trust at all levels of interaction between the Government and the Acholi community, and supporting the process of reconciliation accepted by all stakeholders would help to counter the likelihood of a relapse into another national crisis.

33. Immediate prospects for a political settlement to the conflict in northern Uganda remain uncertain. While the peace mediation process associated with Betty Bigombe has stalled, international opinion is divided on whether either side will demonstrate sufficient will to seek a political solution.

34. The regional impact of the insurgency is a cause for further concern. LRA attacks and abductions in southern Sudan have slowed humanitarian action and have the potential to undermine the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The engagement between MONUC peacekeepers and LRA in January 2006 in Garamba National Park has underscored the need to further reassess the

security threat created by additional armed groups in the volatile eastern section of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

35. I welcome the renewed engagement of the Government of Uganda and the Security Council to address the situation in the LRA-affected areas. I take note of the briefing to the Council by two senior ministers of the Government of Uganda on 19 April 2006 on the situation created by LRA in the region and their proposals on how best to address it. In view of the recent attacks in southern Sudan and the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, it is urgent to devise a coherent response by all stakeholders to the security threat created by LRA. I would like to reiterate that the solution to the long-running conflict lies in a well-coordinated approach that addresses the root causes of the conflict as well as its regional implications.

36. The crisis in northern Uganda goes beyond the confrontation of LRA with the Ugandan Government and the terror it has unleashed against the civilian population. It has been fuelled, in part, by the general resentment of the population in northern Uganda against perceived economic, political and social exclusion. If left unresolved, the long-standing resentment will continue to reproduce the conditions that gave rise to the initial insurgency in 1986. The primary responsibility to address the situation in northern Uganda, its humanitarian and human rights dimensions, and the underlying political problems, therefore lies with the Government of Uganda.

37. The decision to hold a national dialogue rests with the Government of Uganda. The United Nations stands ready to assist the Government of Uganda in that respect.

38. The fact that five leaders of LRA, including Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, have been indicted by the International Criminal Court, was believed to have made them less approachable for negotiations. Nevertheless, recent contacts between the Government of Southern Sudan and Messrs. Kony and Otti, with the apparent knowledge of the Government of Uganda, suggest the possibility of a negotiated solution with LRA. However, such contacts also raise the issues of impunity and the responsibility of the Southern Sudanese authorities to apprehend the individuals indicted by the Court.

39. There continues to be a need to develop a credible and attractive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme that could help the Government of Uganda to address the needs of former combatants, in particular women, minors and people with disabilities. In doing so, it is necessary to ensure that such assistance will promote full reintegration of LRA ex-combatants into the communities of return and not alienate them further by privileging them over other vulnerable groups not associated with the fighting forces.

40. The humanitarian emergency will not be resolved until the necessary security conditions are created on the ground. This would require the building of confidence between the population of northern Uganda and the national army which has been associated with the suffering of these communities.

41. I note with satisfaction the improved cooperation between the external actors and the Government of Uganda on a number of issues critical to the settlement of the conflict in northern Uganda. The launching in Kampala, on 4 May 2006, of the Joint Monitoring Committee is particularly important. It is promising that the Committee, as a mechanism for the implementation of the emergency plan for humanitarian interventions in the LRA-affected areas in northern Uganda, brings together the Government, the donors, the United Nations system and its

humanitarian partners in addressing the immediate requirements for humanitarian assistance and reconciliation in northern Uganda. I urge the Government of Uganda to be fully committed to the implementation of the plan.

42. Despite the launch of the national policy on internally displaced persons by the Government and the commitment from the authorities to develop better mechanisms to address human rights violations in northern Uganda, there remain serious challenges in ensuring protection of the civilians affected by LRA activities. I would encourage the Government, with the support and collaboration of the international community, to provide appropriate resources to adequately implement the national policy on internally displaced persons.

43. The relations between OHCHR and the Government are based on the memorandum of understanding signed during the High Commissioner's visit to Uganda in January 2006. It provides for comprehensive promotion and protection of the OHCHR mandate throughout the country. The relations have so far been constructive, including in terms of dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues in the security sector, such as support for training of the military and the police forces, as well as possibly the administration of the penitentiary system, on human rights issues. In cooperation with the Uganda Human Rights Commission, OHCHR has engaged in establishing civil-military cooperation centres in all districts in northern Uganda, which are intended to enhance the protection of civilians and improve relations between security forces and civilians.

44. The United Nations stands for pacific ways and means of addressing the challenges created by LRA activities in northern Uganda and the Great Lakes region. The military solution to the LRA problem raises serious concern owing to the fact that many of the LRA fighters are abducted children and under-age soldiers who are forced to fight under the threat of death. Negotiating their surrender would be a more appropriate way of dealing with the problem of child combatants and should be the proposed solution.

V. Recommendations

45. Several Member States have called for the establishment of a panel of experts to expose the sources of material and financial support for LRA. I invite Member States and Governments in the region, collectively or in their individual capacity, to examine what possible action they could take in respect of LRA sources of funding. As for the panel of experts, I leave it to the Security Council to decide on the opportuneness of establishing a new mechanism. However, efficient use of the existing panels operating in the region and expanding their mandates to include investigation on the backers and supply channels of LRA could be an option.

46. I also note the commitment of the Government of Uganda and the Core Group countries to finalize the national peace, recovery and development plan for northern Uganda. The plan would incorporate earlier projects for LRA-affected areas and would provide a framework for international involvement in the efforts to address the root causes and the implications of the LRA insurgency. To ensure ownership of the plan and enable it to function as an instrument of peacebuilding, I urge the Government to actively engage the leadership of the affected communities in northern Uganda. I also urge the Security Council to endorse this effort and support the implementation of the plan.

47. The expanded role of the Core Group can provide valuable support for a comprehensive solution on the ground. I encourage the Core Group to continue its active collaboration with the Government of Uganda. I further encourage the member States of the Core Group to strengthen their collaboration and strive for the definition of a unified and comprehensive agenda of assistance to northern Uganda.

48. Furthermore, I urge the Core Group to work with the Government of Uganda on the issues of socio-economic reintegration of former LRA combatants and assistance to internally displaced persons and other affected groups within the broader framework of addressing the plight of the internally displaced communities. It is necessary to pursue a coherent policy to encourage the non-indicted middle and lower ranks of LRA to defect and seek reintegration. Such a policy must build upon the existing Amnesty Act of Uganda, ensuring the safety of former combatants and equal access with other vulnerable groups to opportunities for socio-economic advancement.

49. The Amnesty Commission of Uganda is an appropriate legal mechanism that could offer a number of advantages in addressing the implications of LRA activities. However, the Commission should pursue a robust and pragmatic approach in order to solve the problems and weaknesses related to the amnesty process, and to initiate follow-up activities to address the needs of ex-LRA combatants and the abductees. It would be particularly important to identify, without delay, an appropriate framework and guidelines to assist the Amnesty Commission and its partners in launching and sustaining socio-economic opportunities. The work of the Commission should be based on a solid information management system. Given the disruptive consequences of the LRA insurgency for the civilian population of northern Uganda, strong field capacity, with highly professional advocacy and counselling services, should be created. That would help the communities, families and individuals traumatized by the LRA insurgency to overcome the painful experience and return their lives to normalcy. The United Nations would be prepared to complement such efforts with technical advice and expertise. I would like to stress that without solid donor support, these initiatives may not be implemented in a timely and sustained manner. I therefore appeal to all potential donors to provide immediate support to the efforts of the Amnesty Commission in this area.

50. The idea of appointing a senior-level envoy to help the Government of Uganda to deal with the situation created by the LRA activities has been advocated by some Member States and the community of non-governmental organizations engaged in northern Uganda. President Yoweri Museveni agreed in principle to the idea of a senior-level envoy, but the mandate of such an envoy remains to be agreed upon. The Government of Uganda appears reluctant to accept a special envoy to deal with domestic issues. I would advise that, to be effective, the envoy should work together with the Government of Uganda, with the support of the Core Group and in consultation with other relevant actors, towards a negotiated settlement to the conflict leading to national reconciliation. The envoy should also ensure that the security concerns of the Governments in the region, created by the LRA presence within their borders, are addressed, and their responses are harmonized.

51. While recognizing the threat posed by LRA, I should like to reiterate that, since UNMIS and MONUC already have challenging tasks to perform in their respective areas of responsibility, they should channel their capacities and resources

primarily to address those challenges. UNMIS is in its final stage of deployment, while the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement continues to face considerable difficulties. Furthermore, UNMIS has carried out preliminary planning work for expanding United Nations operations in Darfur and is continuing to prepare for that operation, as called for in Security Council resolution 1679 (2006). MONUC is fully mobilized to support the efforts of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to organize a credible and violence-free electoral process, which starts at the end of July and will extend at least into September.

52. Dealing with the regional implications of LRA activities lies within the area of national responsibility of the Governments in the region. UNMIS and MONUC can provide assistance, within their existing mandates and capabilities, but should not be seen as an alternative to authorities in the LRA-affected region in the maintenance of law and order.

53. As UNMIS reaches full operational capacity, it will be able, within the existing capabilities and in compliance with its rules of engagement, to establish a more formal framework of ground military patrols with helicopter support, subject to availability, which would provide a secure environment for United Nations operations, facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the promotion of human rights and make the area less benign for LRA and for other bandit activity. This could be done notwithstanding the severe operation constraints described above.

54. It should be emphasized that the countries of the region have an overwhelming capacity to address the LRA threat. If the Governments in the region find a mutually agreeable way to strengthen cooperation on the ground among their security forces, it could create a solid basis to deal more effectively with the lingering threat from LRA. However, I would urge them to seek a coherent approach to this challenge, which should be based on strict adherence to the provisions of international law, including respect for the inviolability of the internationally recognized borders and territorial integrity of the States affected by the activities of LRA and other illegal armed groups.

55. In the interest of good-neighbourliness among the countries of the region, the activities of LRA should be subjected to the scrutiny of a reliable mechanism that would help inform national decision makers on a continuous basis. There are already mechanisms in place, such as the "Tripartite Plus", where coordination and collaboration between the Government of Uganda and its neighbours can be strengthened. In addition, the agreement signed in Luanda in September 2002 between President Joseph Kabila of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda provides the basic legal framework for both parties to discuss security concerns at their border areas, and work on a practical collaboration to solve these concerns. I therefore encourage the two Governments to engage in open bilateral discussions to address the present situation. The possibility of a direct engagement of FARDC against the LRA elements illegally present in the Democratic Republic of the Congo could be brought up during the discussions.

56. There is a need for the United Nations agencies to work closely with Member States with the requisite capacity in gathering and sharing more information about LRA. From a security standpoint, accurate and real-time intelligence is essential in limiting and, possibly, preventing LRA activities. UNMIS and MONUC already exchange regular information on LRA at senior mission and sector levels, as well as

through a joint LRA coordination cell. This information-sharing will be extended to the United Nations system in Uganda, where appropriate. I would like to invite Governments with intelligence capacity to share intelligence with the United Nations agencies and Government forces on the ground, through the mechanisms already in place.

57. With regard to information exchange on LRA, the United Nations is of the view that the agreement between SAF, SPLA and UPDF formed the basis of significant cooperation between the primary military entities. An expanded intelligence-sharing forum involving UPDF, SAF, SPLA and FARDC, with the possible participation of the United Nations, would be another way to formalize this cooperation. Such a forum would provide updates on LRA movements, positions, tactics and attacks on a regular basis to all concerned parties.

58. The disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration of LRA elements should be encouraged through the establishment of a formal mechanism. Although the activities of LRA are definitely more oriented towards southern Sudan, we support the establishment of an Amnesty Commission office in Haut-Uele, near the reported presence of LRA in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. It would have a similar purpose as the office that existed in Beni for the demobilization and repatriation of elements of the Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda. Consideration could be also given to establishing a similar Amnesty Commission office in southern Sudan. In addition, I encourage the Government of Uganda to examine the opportunity of an information campaign which would convey the appropriate DDR messages to the LRA fighters. At the same time, I would like to stress that appropriate funding and strengthened programme delivery need to be expedited in a joint effort of the donors, United Nations agencies, the World Bank and implementing partners.

59. Addressing the situation of children affected by the conflict should be given a true priority. My Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict is in contact with the Government of Uganda and the Core Group on the issue of the reintegration of the LRA child soldiers, and on addressing the situation of abducted minors. The Special Representative, who visited Uganda in June 2006, will continue to focus on these complex matters, to ensure that they remain at the centre of United Nations efforts to address the problem of LRA.

60. Given the magnitude of destruction and underdevelopment in northern Uganda caused by LRA, a focused and comprehensive approach should be taken to help the Ugandan authorities to address the challenges of recovery, rehabilitation and, where possible, sustained development. The United Nations is working closely with those concerned with the economic and social situation in northern Uganda, in the format of the Core Group, and will continue to support the activities of the Joint Monitoring Committee. However, the long-term objectives of redressing the situation in northern Uganda should be dealt with in the context of the peace, recovery and development plan. It is hoped that this plan will help to identify and implement sustainable development initiatives that will improve socio-economic services and opportunities in northern Uganda and lead to more equitable social spending for the north. In that regard, I appeal to the international community, including donors, to maintain coherent and consistent support to Ugandan authorities during its development and implementation.

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Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-first year

Identical letters dated 3 July 2006 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Israel, the occupying Power, continues with its aggression of military raids and assaults on Palestinian cities and towns in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, endangering the lives of the defenceless Palestinian civilian population and causing further destruction to Palestinian property and infrastructure, in flagrant violation and grave breach of the relevant rules and provisions of international law.

Recent statements and declarations by Israeli officials indicate the occupying Power's intention to continue and escalate this violent military and terror campaign against the Palestinian people and their leadership. In addition, the occupying Power continues to detain those elected Palestinian officials it kidnapped last week, severely undermining the functioning of the Palestinian Authority and exacerbating already high tensions. Such ongoing attacks by Israel, in addition to its incessant provocations and incitement, portend the continued steep decline of the situation on the ground in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, particularly in the Gaza Strip, and the perpetuation of the deadly cycle of violence reignited by the occupying Power, with undoubtedly dire consequences for the very fragile security situation and the grave humanitarian conditions on the ground.

In this regard, I regret to inform you that the Israeli occupying forces have continued to attack areas in the Gaza Strip by missile air strikes launched from warplanes and helicopter gunships as well as by artillery bombardment launched from tanks and gunboats, causing further destruction to properties and infrastructure, including a school and several main roads. Yesterday, the occupying forces also continued their targeting of elected Palestinian officials and government institutions, striking the offices of the Palestinian Prime Minister, Mr. Ismail Haniyeh, in Gaza City with missiles and causing severe damage to the building. Air strikes were also carried out in other areas, including in Beit Lahiya and Beit Hanoun, resulting in the killing of at least two Palestinian men and the wounding of several other Palestinians, including a man inside his own home in Beit Hanoun. Israeli troops remain in the

06-41610 (E) 030706

southern Gaza Strip as well as along the northern Gaza border and actually crossed into northern Gaza today with tanks and bulldozers, threatening to widen the military campaign and causing rising fears, trauma and panic among the Palestinian civilian population in the area.

Despite all such violent and unlawful Israeli actions, the Palestinian leadership continues to exert efforts to diplomatically address the prevailing crisis and to promote calm, with absolutely no reciprocation by the occupying Power. In this regard, it must be clearly reiterated that there is no military solution to this crisis and that the continuing military assaults by the Israeli occupying forces against the Palestinian people and their leadership will only further exacerbate the situation, gravely endanger civilian lives and cause even more humanitarian suffering, destruction and loss. Additionally, the persistence of illegal and irrational actions by the occupying Power, including the ongoing threats being declared by Israeli officials, the latest by the Defense Minister himself, against the Syrian Arab Republic following Israel's violation of Syrian airspace last week, are causing the greater destabilization of the situation in the area and threaten the security of the entire region.

The international community must continue to exert efforts to address this critical situation, aimed at averting its further deterioration, in order to save the lives of innocent and defenceless civilians and to save the two sides, as well as the region as a whole, from plunging into an irrevocable cycle of violence. The international community, including the Security Council of the United Nations, cannot abandon its responsibilities in the face of this rising threat to the already too fragile, tense and instable security situation in the Middle East. In this regard, we reiterate that Israel's aggression and illegal practices against the Palestinian people and their leadership should be strongly condemned and that Israel should be demanded to abide by all of its obligations under international law, including the Fourth Geneva Convention. Serious efforts should be undertaken to compel the occupying Power to immediately cease its aggressions in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including, inter alia, the immediate cessation of military attacks against the Palestinian civilian population, cessation of the destruction of properties, withdrawal of its forces to outside the Gaza Strip and release of all of the Palestinian officials it has detained, and to give diplomacy a chance to defuse the current crisis.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 250 letters to you regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 29 June 2006 (A/ES-10/342-S/2006/460), constitute a basic record of the crimes being committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, State terrorism and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2006/480

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 July 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 3 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey that the Government of India has decided to nominate Mr. Shashi Tharoor to the post of the next Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Mr. Tharoor, an Indian national, has served the United Nations since 1978. In January 2001, he was appointed as interim Head of the Department of Public Information. On 1 June 2002, he was confirmed as the Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information of the United Nations. A biographical note on Mr. Shashi Tharoor is attached.

India strongly supports the principle of geographical rotation under which the next Secretary-General of the United Nations should be from Asia. We also believe that a prospective United Nations Secretary-General should have impeccable credentials, be acceptable to the broadest possible membership of the United Nations and have a strong commitment to the reform of the United Nations and the interests of the developing countries.

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nirupam **Sen**

06-41703 (E) 070706

Annex to the letter dated 3 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Shashi Tharoor

Biographical note

Shashi Tharoor is currently United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information and has led the Department of Public Information since January 2001. In this capacity, he has led the reform of one of the larger departments in the Secretariat, with some 750 staff and field offices in 63 countries around the world.

At the Secretary-General's request, in January 2001 Mr. Tharoor accepted what was initially intended as a temporary assignment as interim head of the widely criticized Department of Public Information. His hands-on leadership of that Department and the initiation of far-reaching reforms led the Secretary-General to confirm him as Under-Secretary-General in 2002. As head of the Department, Mr. Tharoor has:

- Transformed what was seen as an ineffective and bureaucratic department, weighed down by a plethora of General Assembly mandates, into a focused, streamlined and results-oriented centre of excellence;
- Become the first Secretariat leader to successfully close down United Nations offices, by shutting down eight United Nations Information Centres in Western Europe in the face of considerable political and bureaucratic opposition;
- Devised a new and clear mission statement for his staff, conceived a new operating model for the Department and reorganized its functioning, including through eliminating non-essential functions and services;
- Vastly improved coordination within the United Nations system and across departments, funds, programmes and agencies in the dissemination of public information, notably through the establishment of an inter-agency United Nations Communications Group; and
- Set new standards in results-based management and the creation of a culture of evaluation, establishing an annual programme impact review for all managers in the Department that requires them to produce measurable reports on the effectiveness of their products and services (this has now been adopted as a model for the rest of the Organization).

In this capacity, Mr. Tharoor has also served on the Senior Management Group, the Policy Committee, the Iraq Task Force, the Steering Committee on Reform and Management and the Working Group on Post-Cold War Security. Bilingual in English and French, he was appointed United Nations Coordinator for Multilingualism in 2003.

Prior to this assignment, Mr. Tharoor served as the Director of Communications and Special Projects in the Office of the Secretary-General (1997-2001) and as a senior adviser to the Secretary-General. In this role he:

- Advised the Secretary-General on a number of strategic issues and undertook sensitive assignments, including accompanying him on official missions abroad and monitoring the performance of various United Nations offices and departments on behalf of the Secretary-General;

- Served on various working groups and task forces on institutional reform and organizational strategy;

- Oversaw the opening up of the Organization to public scrutiny, through the issuance of new guidelines for dealing with the media; and

- Devised and led the Communications Group, an effective vehicle for coordinating information-sharing across the United Nations system.

His previous assignment at United Nations Headquarters in New York was as Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations (1989-1996). In this eventful period:

- From 1991 to 1996, he led the team in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations responsible for the United Nations peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia — travelling frequently to the region to oversee the work of the field missions and negotiate with leaders on all sides of the conflict, managing the Headquarters political and military staff assigned to these missions, attending daily Security Council meetings on the issue in order to send policy guidance to the field, drafting reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, liaising daily with Member States as the situation evolved, managing relations with NATO and leading the Task Force on the former Yugoslavia;

- He worked with two successive heads of United Nations peacekeeping operations in managing the challenges of unprecedented growth and evolution in peacekeeping at the end of the Cold War, serving as Chief of Staff for the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, supervising issues of budget, staffing and administration, and overseeing the plans for the expansion of the Department and its merger with the Field Operations Division; and

- He supervised the staff working on the evolution of peacekeeping policy and strategic issues, articulating a new vision of United Nations peacekeeping principles and practices in the changed global environment, and set up the nucleus of what has since become the Lessons Learned and Peacekeeping Best Practices Units.

Mr. Tharoor's United Nations career began in 1978 on the staff of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Geneva. He was assigned as Head of the UNHCR office in Singapore (1981-1984) during the peak of the Vietnamese "boat people" crisis. Among his significant accomplishments in this role, he:

- Oversaw a reduction in the refugee caseload of over 80 per cent, principally through greater success in resettlement using a variety of innovative and creative methods;

- Played a leading role in devising creative solutions to a number of problems relating to refugees rescued at sea, including refugees rescued by ships flying flags of convenience and those belonging to developing countries;

- Administered the refugee camp, introducing practices of camp management through refugee elections of their own leaders; and
- Handled discreetly and successfully several non-Vietnamese refugee cases, including the first Polish refugees after the declaration of martial law in December 1981 and the first group of Acehnese to enter Singapore surreptitiously. These problems were solved without publicity and without creating international embarrassment — notably the case of a Polish seaman who jumped ship and took refuge on board a United States destroyer, nearly sparking off a diplomatic crisis between Singapore and the United States of America which Mr. Tharoor defused.

Success in Singapore brought him back to UNHCR headquarters as Deputy Chief of the Secretariat, a unit dealing with UNHCR governmental relations, in particular with the UNHCR Executive Committee. He then became the organization's first-ever Executive Assistant to the Deputy High Commissioner, a role in which he helped the Deputy High Commissioner devise and implement a new approach to coordinating the organization's various operational activities worldwide.

Mr. Tharoor is the award-winning author of nine books, as well as numerous articles and op-eds in a wide range of publications, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The International Herald Tribune and Newsweek. His books and essays include:

- *Reasons of State*, a study of Indian foreign-policymaking;
- *India: From Midnight to the Millennium*, widely hailed as one of the best books ever written on contemporary India and cited by President Clinton in his address to the Indian Parliament;
- "Are human rights universal?", a rejection of arguments against the universality of human rights, published in the *World Policy Journal*;
- "Should peacekeeping go back to basics?", published in *Survival* at the end of the first post-cold war phase of United Nations peacekeeping, analysing the challenges facing United Nations peacekeeping in the new era;
- "The role of the Secretary-General", an analysis of the opportunities and limitations of the job of Secretary-General of the United Nations, published by the Government of Sweden on the occasion of the centenary of Dag Hammarskjöld; and
- "Why America Still Needs the UN", published in *Foreign Affairs* in the fall of 2003, just after the Iraq war, arguing the case for continued United States engagement with the United Nations.

Born in London in 1956, Mr. Tharoor was educated in India and the United States, completing a PhD in 1978 at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, where he received the Robert B. Stewart Prize for Best Student. At Fletcher, Shashi Tharoor helped found and was the first editor of the *Fletcher Forum of International Affairs*, a journal now in its thirty-first year.

In January 1998, Mr. Tharoor was named by the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, as a "Global Leader of Tomorrow". He is the recipient of several awards, including a Commonwealth Writers' Prize, and was awarded the

highest honour for overseas Indians, the Pravasi Bharatiya Samman, in 2004. He serves on the Board of Overseers of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the board of trustees of the Aspen Institute, India, and the Advisory Board of the World Policy Journal. He is also a Fellow of the New York Institute of the Humanities.

Shashi Tharoor is the father of twin sons who are undergraduates at Yale University.

United Nations S/2006/481

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 July 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 4 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the launch of ballistic missiles or unidentified flying vehicles by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

(*Signed*) Kenzo **Oshima**
Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations

06-41697 (E) 050706

United Nations S/2006/482

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 July 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 4 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

The United States has reviewed the letter of the Permanent Representative of Japan dated 4 July 2006 to the President of the Security Council. We concur in his request for an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the matter referred to in his letter.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) John R. **Bolton**
Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations

06-41709 (E) 050706

United Nations S/2006/483

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 June 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 26 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I am pleased to send you the report of the Workshop for Newly-Elected and Present Security Council Members, which was held on 28 and 29 November 2005 at Tarrytown House (see annex). The report has been finalized in the light of comments received from the participants. The final report has been compiled in accordance with the Chatham House Rules under the sole responsibility of the Permanent Mission of Finland.

Based on the very positive feedback we received from the participants, the Government of Finland remains committed to sponsoring the workshop as an annual event. The Government of Finland expresses the hope that this report will not only assist in familiarizing newly elected members with the working methods and procedures of the Council, but also contribute to a better understanding among the wider United Nations membership of the complexity of the work of the Council.

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Kirsti **Lintonen**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations

06-41967 (E) 170706

Annex to the letter dated 26 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Finland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

"Hitting the Ground Running":
Third Annual Workshop for Newly Elected Members of the Security Council

28 and 29 November 2005
Tarrytown Conference Center
Tarrytown, New York

The Government of Finland – in cooperation with the Center on International Organization of Columbia University, the Security Council Affairs Division of the United Nations Secretariat, and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) – convened the third annual workshop for the newly elected members of the Security Council on 28 and 29 November 2005.

The annual workshops have served to help familiarize the newly elected members with the practice, procedure and working methods of the Council so that they are in a position to "hit the ground running" when they join the Council the following January. The series has also provided current members of the Council with an opportunity to reflect on their work in an informal setting. The workshops have been designed to complement the annual UNITAR briefings on aspects of the Council's work.

This year, the opening evening featured remarks by Lakhdar Brahimi, Under-Secretary-General and Special Advisor to the Secretary-General. Drawing on his long experience in United Nations mediation and peacebuilding efforts, Ambassador Brahimi highlighted both the progress that had been made and five dimensions in which further improvements were needed. The latter included a knowledge deficit, resources, managing expectations, rule of law, and elections and constitutions.

The full-day programme on 29 November included five roundtable sessions on the following themes:

I. Evolving roles and working methods

II. Security Council committees and working groups

III. Organization of work

IV. Broadening inputs and outreach

V. Implementation of the 2005 World Summit Outcome: implications for the Security Council

For the second session, on committees and working groups, the participants were divided into three smaller break-out groups to permit more intensive discussion and sharing of experiences.

Session I
Evolving roles and working methods

Moderator:
Ambassador Ellen Margrethe Loj
Permanent Representative of Denmark

Commentators:

Ambassador Emyr Jones Parry
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom

Ambassador Zhang Yishan
Deputy Permanent Representative of the People's Republic of China

Opening the session, the moderator observed that there was often scant difference in form between the Council's public meetings and closed (informal) consultations, both featured a tendency to read prepared statements rather than to engage in interactive, strategic debate. Too much time was also devoted to routine discussion on the extension of peacekeeping mandates. In that regard, the President should have more authority and leeway in setting the Council's agenda. Likewise, the Secretary-General's monthly luncheon with Council members should involve more strategic debate and less formal reporting. Within the Council, it was understandable that permanent members usually played a lead role in addressing long-standing items on the Council's agenda, while the non-permanent members often chaired subsidiary bodies (e.g., sanctions committees and working groups). However, to get the elected members more involved with the Council's conflict-related work, permanent members could pair with non-permanent ones in addressing specific crisis situations.

Refinements in working methods

The commentators and other speakers echoed the moderator's concerns about the overly formal nature of Council meetings and the subsequent lack of interactive and strategic debate. Participants called for fewer consultations and meetings, shorter and less frequent interventions in informal consultations, and restraint in the reading of prepared statements. According to several speakers, briefings by the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) could be abbreviated so as to allow more time for questions and discussion. This would allow the Council to hold SRSGs more fully accountable for mandate implementation, strategy, and mission discipline. Moreover, too much time was devoted to preparing the Council's press statements, a matter over which the Council President should be allowed more leeway.

One speaker held the view that there was too frequent reporting by United Nations and external speakers on routine matters, which added to the Council's burgeoning workload. The participants identified a number of ways to enhance the Council's efficiency. For instance, its agenda could be streamlined by avoiding debates on issues only tangentially related to peace and security. The information technology (IT) available to the Council could be enhanced by providing laptop computers in the Consultations Room and by utilizing videoteleconferences (VTCs) for monthly consultations with SRSGs and others. One participant suggested that it would be helpful if briefing packets were prepared for incoming members, while

another asked whether the Secretariat could disseminate its briefing notes from consultations and meetings to Council members.

A number of speakers, including the commentators, saw scope for improving the Council's transparency and effectiveness through enhanced cooperation with other United Nations organs and with external actors, such as regional organizations and the international financial institutions, on post-conflict peacebuilding issues. Several speakers commented that the monthly luncheons with the Secretary-General should be utilized for a more productive, focused, and strategic exchange of views than had often been the case. One participant called for more regular meetings between the Presidents of the Council, the General Assembly, and ECOSOC. Another urged closer cooperation with the African Union, given that African issues absorbed approximately 60 percent of the Council's time. One speaker cautioned, however, that wider consultations did not always produce better results. For example, too often efforts to reach out to troop-contributing countries (TCCs), such as through formal meetings between Council members, TCCs and the Secretariat, as provided for in resolution 1353 (2001), had become overly-formalized and yielded little in the way of real, free-thinking exchanges of views. While the Council needed to continue to look for ways to boost its transparency, it should avoid innovation for its own sake.

Thematic debates

A range of views were expressed, by the commentators and others, about the value of thematic debates, which everyone acknowledged had become a major component of the Council's work. Some participants expressed concern about the balance between thematic and country-specific debates, cautioning that the Council should avoid assuming the responsibilities of other principal organs, such as the General Assembly and ECOSOC. On the other hand, other speakers emphasized the usefulness of thematic debates, if the topics were carefully selected. Productive examples included the recent debate on peacebuilding, which included valuable interaction between the Council and the President of the World Bank, and the two recent debates on the rule of law in post-conflict situations. As another speaker noted, some of the most critical challenges facing Africa and other regions transcended traditional notions of peace and security. Thematic debates could help focus the Council's attention on such complex and cross-cutting challenges and bring valuable outside expertise to the discussion.

Nevertheless, others warned, the Council needed to maintain an appropriate balance between thematic and country-specific debates. At that point, in November 2005, the Council was said to have 21 country-specific and 21 thematic issues on its agenda. With so many issues being added to the Council's already heavy workload, it was questioned whether the Council could still fulfil its responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. Others contended that thematic debates were often too general and insufficiently related to the current crises facing the Council. It was suggested that thematic debates include shorter and more focused presentations by outside speakers, along with more thorough follow-up.

Peacebuilding

In recent years, it was noted, peacebuilding had come to occupy a growing portion of the Council's attention. The proposed Peacebuilding Commission, in that regard, should be welcomed as a positive step toward enhancing the international community's overall peacebuilding capabilities. These needed to address the three pillars of successful post-conflict peacebuilding — (i) stabilization of the security situation, (ii) institution-building and promoting the rule of law, and (iii) economic recovery. One commentator underlined that, while the Council had primary responsibility for international peace and security, it did not have an exclusive role when it came to peacebuilding. Since the process of peacebuilding entailed a broad circle of stakeholders, the Council needed to be aware of what international financial institutions, regional organizations, and local actors were seeking to contribute to the common effort.

Ministerial meetings

In recent years, the Council has met more frequently at the ministerial level. Most speakers expressed mixed feelings about this practice. Such high-level sessions, it was pointed out, might be useful in drawing world attention to an emerging threat to international peace and security. They could also serve to demonstrate the Council's unity and/or resolve on a particular issue. It was also noted, however, that the substantive value of such high-level exchanges had varied and that involving ministers or heads of state in the negotiation of Council resolutions or statements could have unpredictable consequences. According to several participants, the Council should retain the option of meeting at a ministerial or summit level occasionally, but this practice should not be invoked too frequently or without careful consideration and planning.

Session II
Security Council committees and working groups

Following brief introductory remarks by Ambassador Adamantios Th. Vassilakis, the Permanent Representative of Greece, the participants divided into three break-out groups to permit more intensive discussion and sharing of their experiences with Security Council committees and working groups. Ambassador Vassilakis moderated one of the break-out groups and Ambassador Gheorghe Dumitru, the Deputy Permanent Representative of Romania, and Ambassador Ellen Margrethe Løj, the Permanent Representative of Denmark, the other two. The following is a synthesis of the discussions that took place in the three break-out groups.

Several speakers underlined the importance of the work performed by the committees and working groups, though it tended to be less visible to the press and public. The subsidiary bodies provided an essential means of encouraging and overseeing the implementation of Council decisions. However, effectively guiding one or more subsidiary organs created a substantial burden for the non-permanent members, which usually chaired these groups. For incoming members of the Council, the workload could seem especially heavy. Given the technical nature of much of their operational and monitoring work, some of the subsidiary bodies depended heavily on experts. It was critical, therefore, that they be selected carefully and that there be sufficient oversight of their work. It was suggested, for

example, that some of the monitoring groups themselves needed clearer guidance and closer supervision. Though generally chaired by Permanent Representatives, the committees and working groups tended to meet at a relatively low level, without sufficient political input, according to one participant. As another speaker put it, the very dependence of these groups on experts underscored the critical role that Permanent Representatives needed to play in their management. Several discussants asserted that the critical nature of the work carried out by the subsidiary bodies insured that they were here to stay, but one speaker questioned whether the Council had not simply gotten into the habit of creating more and more such groups as new challenges arose.

It was pointed out that some of these groups address thematic issues, some undertake operational roles, and others, like the Working Group on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, did both. In areas such as sanctions and counter-terrorism, in which a number of committees perform similar functions, the importance of coordination and sharing of lessons learned was emphasized. The chairs of these groups might meet more frequently. It was suggested by several discussants that committees and working groups should go to the Council more regularly to discuss the challenges they face. Another speaker urged chairs from non-permanent members to seek the advice of permanent members when addressing longstanding security issues. Ultimately, it was pointed out, the Council bore the responsibility for the work of its subsidiary bodies and should review them more regularly.

There was considerable discussion of, but no consensus on, the working methods of the subsidiary bodies and whether the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions should be revived for a more extended period. Why should the subsidiary groups operate under consensus rules, asked one participant, when the Council itself did not? It was suggested that the Council hold a workshop on working methods, as well as a lessons-learned exercise concerning the work of its subsidiary bodies. Some speakers contended that the Council should make greater efforts to reform its working methods, including having a working group discuss the so-called "S5" proposals (see General Assembly draft resolution A/60/L.49 of 17 March 2006). Others, however, expressed scepticism about the S5 proposals and about the wisdom of setting up a formal mechanism for the review of the Council's working methods, while agreeing on the need to take into account the views of the United Nations larger membership. Though there was no agreement on whether it would make sense to revive the Informal Working Group or to assign it the task of reviewing working methods, several participants underscored that the earlier practice of having the group be chaired by the President of the Council guaranteed a lack of continuity in its deliberations. One possibility, it was suggested, would be to have a permanent member and a non-permanent member co-chair the working group. (Following the Workshop, the members of the Security Council agreed that the chairmanship of the Informal Working Group on Documentation and Other Procedural Questions would be from 1 February to 30 June 2006, at which point the tenure of the Chair will be reviewed, and that the Permanent Representative of Japan would serve as Chair (Note by the President dated 31 January 2006, S/2006/66)).

The work of the sanctions committees also attracted many comments. As one speaker put it, the sanctions committees acted as the de facto executive branch of the Security Council. Though sanctions committees imposed a heavy workload on the incoming members, especially those without a lot of experience with some of

their more technical dimensions, it was noted that more sanctions regimes were likely to be mandated in the future, as they remained the Council's chief enforcement tool. The larger number of sanctions committees, however, had suggested to some the need for greater coordination and coherence. As in other areas of the Council's work, it was recommended that the chairs of the sanctions committees meet more frequently to compare lessons learned. Though the Working Group on General Issues of Sanctions had become inactive, it was in the process of being revived. According to one speaker, the proliferation of sanctions committees raised the question of whether there needed to be a distinct committee and set of monitors assigned to each sanctions regime. Could there be some sort of consolidation, through engaging experts to work on more than one sanctions regime or by permitting regional reporting for smaller states?

Several discussants commented on the recurring tensions between political considerations in a peace process and the requirements for effective implementation of Council-imposed sanctions. More effort was needed to sharpen the targeting of sanctions to ensure maximum impact on the individuals concerned and minimal negative effects on the wider population, while still achieving the Council's political objectives. More attention needed to be paid to natural resource management in those conflict-affected areas where proceeds had been used to fuel conflict. At the same time, arms embargo guidelines should be sufficiently flexible to permit adaptation to changing conditions on the ground. More attention also needed to be paid to the sources of the weapons. Too often, arms embargoes were hindered by porous borders, as in the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and weak institutions in neighbouring countries. In some cases, it was suggested, it would be helpful for the chair of the sanctions committee to have the relevant regional expertise to understand such conditions. On the other hand, others contended that some distance could be helpful in terms of providing the appearance of impartiality. Sanctions committees had to rely on the advice of experts, yet political and geographical considerations generally determined the success of their work. Too often, Council-imposed sanctions were simply not implemented. Despite these hurdles, it was observed that any delay in mandating and implementing sanctions might be interpreted by one or more parties as a lack of will on the Council's part.

The Council had frequently been criticized for lacking clear criteria for the listing and delisting of individuals for targeted sanctions, as well as for insufficient transparency in such matters. Some speakers stressed, however, that it was extremely difficult to develop objective and precise criteria. Due process might not be possible when the Council needed to act quickly at the political level. In such cases, scrutiny needed to be balanced with efficacy. Nevertheless, it was underscored that experts were not prosecutors, nor sanctions committees courts. One participant, commenting that movement on due process questions was taking place too slowly and urging the chairs of the sanctions committees to get together to consider how to proceed, warned that at some point one of several European courts might question one of the Council's listing decisions. Another speaker responded that it would undermine the Council's authority under Chapter VII for a court to make such a finding. According to a third discussant, it would be dangerous to conceive of the Council as having absolute, unconstrained power, and none of this needed to transpire if the Council simply took human rights standards into account in such cases. One possibility would be to establish an ombudsman post, perhaps

staffed from the OHCHR, for those seeking delisting, whether related to 1267 or another sanctions regime, such as the one concerning Liberia. Those with complaints, it was said, needed a place to go if recourse to the Committee proved impractical.

In terms of counter-terrorism, it was asserted that, despite a certain lack of coherence among the Council's four relatively young subsidiary bodies in this field, their establishment had helped to shore up global defences against terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) required substantial reporting from the Member States and that, in turn, imposed a heavy workload on the members and staff of the CTC. The work, moreover, had become increasingly frustrating with each new round of reporting. It was recommended that the CTC undertake an annual review of its work and provide United Nations Member States with a statement of its forward strategy. The 1566 Working Group, on the other hand, was described as a somewhat unhappy compromise that had become a "lonely child" of the Council with an uncertain future.

Session III
Organization of work

Moderator:

Ambassador Jean-Marc de La Sablière
Permanent Representative of France

Commentators:

Ambassador Bayani S. Mercado
Deputy Permanent Representative of the Republic of the Philippines

Ambassador Gheorghe Dumitru
Permanent Representative of Romania

The moderator observed that the proliferation of work and subsidiary machinery of the Security Council had made it difficult for non-members to follow new developments. Improving transparency remained an important priority, though the Council had taken a number of steps to reform its working methods over the past ten to fifteen years. These included the introduction of political coordinators, the earlier preparation of the monthly programme of work (POW), and the closer association of non-members with the work of the Council. The latter was reflected in the drafting of the recent resolution on Côte d'Ivoire. The Council continued to display its case-by-case flexibility, such as through the development and use of "informal informals" when needed.

To one of the commentators, the Secretariat served as the "right and left hand" of the Presidency. By providing information and acting as institutional memory, the Secretariat could help level the playing field for the non-permanent members. Echoing the moderator's comments about preserving the Council's flexibility, he agreed that a rigid codification of the Council's rules of procedure would be a mistake. The other commentator highlighted the important role of political coordinators, whose efforts insured that the Council could function continuously, as called for by Article 28 (1). The pace and breadth of the Council's work, in his words, made service on the Council a "perpetual apprenticeship".

Role of the Secretariat

Participants agreed that the Security Council Affairs Division of the Department of Political Affairs provided immense help to non-permanent members concerning the practices and working methods of the Council. Critically, the Security Council Affairs Division provided essential information for elected members preparing for the Presidency. One participant asked whether the Security Council Affairs Division had a document about the Council's practices and procedures that could be provided for the use of newly-elected members. Another participant urged the Security Council Affairs Division to help maintain the Council's flexibility by recommending positive modifications to procedures, rather than citing precedent.

Political coordinators

The development of the network of political coordinators was widely cited as a welcome innovation. They had been able to serve both individual delegations by providing an additional voice on substantive issues and the Council as a whole by ensuring continuity, by playing a critical role in preparing for and carrying out the Presidency, and by acting as a network for information-sharing and negotiation. However, one participant contended that, while political coordinators acted as essential focal points, their job was not 'political' as such. Rather, the Ambassadors were the overall political coordinators. Nevertheless, there was general agreement that political coordinators were a useful addition, serving a particularly important function for their respective delegation's Presidency.

Efficiency, time management and the role of the Presidency

For incoming members, it was noted, learning how to handle the Council's heavy and varied workload could be a major part of the learning process. A number of speakers commented on how cumbersome the workload of the Council had become. Since a significant proportion of the work was self-generated, it was suggested that there was much that Council members could do to improve the situation. A major impediment, raised repeatedly throughout the workshop, was the tendency for members to read prepared speeches, even in informal consultations. Reading speeches slowed the process and limited the Council's ability to have interactive and strategic consultations. One participant emphasized, however, that capitals sometimes insisted on references to a prepared text to preserve political nuance and to ensure that an accurate record was kept of the proceedings.

According to several speakers, part of the problem related to time management and the distribution of time between lower and higher priority tasks. The often lengthy negotiation of press statements, for example, implied a lack of confidence in the President. With regard to consultations, one participant suggested that, for routine issues, the President could identify in advance where consensus existed and invite members to speak only if they disagreed. Too much time, it was argued, was spent on commenting on non-controversial reports of the Secretary-General. This tendency might be reduced, it was suggested, if members were given more time before reports were formally considered or resolutions were brought to a vote.

Session IV
Broadening inputs and outreach

Moderator:

Ambassador Kenzo Oshima
Permanent Representative of Japan

Commentators:

Ambassador Mourad Benmehidi
Deputy Permanent Representative of Algeria

Ambassador Bodéhoussè Idohou
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Benin

Ambassador Ronaldo Mota Sardenberg
Permanent Representative of Brazil

The opening comments and the discussion that followed focused on three ways in which the Security Council had been seeking to broaden both the inputs into its work and its own outreach efforts: missions to the field; a more inclusive approach to its deliberations; and greater interaction with United Nations agencies, experts, and NGOs. Much of the discussion focused on the efficacy of Security Council missions. While there was general agreement on their usefulness, questions were raised about time and resource constraints, when they should be undertaken, who should participate, and what their terms of reference and objectives should be. On the matter of involving other Member States and of reaching out to agencies, experts, and NGOs, several participants commented that, while there had been progress, the Security Council was still not doing enough to ensure transparency and inclusiveness.

Security Council missions

All agreed that Security Council missions were a useful way for members to develop a clearer and deeper understanding of the circumstances and challenges of the situation on the ground. However, several speakers commented that fact-finding was only one of several purposes that could be served by such missions. They could contribute to conflict prevention, stabilization, and settlement, to sending a message to the parties concerning the Council's commitment and unity, and even to laying the basis for a mid-course correction. Among the successful missions cited were those to Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi.

With respect to the content and agenda of Security Council missions, one participant underlined the importance of acquiring independent sources of information above and beyond that received in Special Representatives' periodic reports. The missions' agendas should, therefore, be targeted at investigation, assessment, and reinforcing the presence of the United Nations in-country. As one of the commentators cautioned, these should not become peacekeeping inspection tours and the participants should bear in mind that the information and assessments they received were filtered through the perspectives of their interlocutors. Through all of this, it was essential that the Council maintain an independent evaluation of the situation. There were differences of view concerning whether the missions tended to

be over-scheduled. Some participants stressed the importance of hearing from local civil society, United Nations agencies, and other non-governmental actors, while others argued that a programme that was too heavy with multiple voices could be confusing and counterproductive.

What criteria should the Council use when weighing the costs and benefits of a proposed mission? One commentator urged that each situation be considered on a case-by-case basis. In some cases, dispatching smaller missions, in which not all Council members participate, was seen as a viable resource-saving option. An example was Ambassador Oshima's recent visit to Ethiopia-Eritrea. Another participant emphasized the importance of timing. Sometimes there was a sense of urgency, but the aim should always be to generate concrete results. It was also noted that, while permanent members had generally led missions in the past, elected members could also take the initiative, as Brazil had done with the joint Security Council-ECOSOC mission to Haiti. It was pointed out that missions being considered for 2006 included West Africa, Afghanistan, and Kosovo.

Working with other Member States

Several speakers pointed out that the Security Council had taken a number of steps over the past decade to improve transparency and inclusiveness. Consultations with troop-contributing countries (TCCs) had become systematic, though they could be livelier and more dynamic. More space had been allocated for interested countries to articulate their views before and after a resolution had been adopted. The Council's subsidiary bodies had often taken the lead in reaching out to other actors and Member States. However, more could be done in the future. One commentator noted that many Member States and non-governmental actors continued to feel that their relationship with the Council was weak, ad hoc, and sporadic. Some resolutions that imposed obligations on all Member States had been adopted without sufficient consultation. Consensus-building could be very helpful in such cases. Often, input from Member States with a particular interest in or experience with an issue could enhance the Council's deliberations and improve the results.

To address these deficits, several suggestions were offered. The Council's annual report to the General Assembly could be made more analytical. Interactions with the General Assembly and ECOSOC could become more regular and less formal. A wrap-up session could be provided for the wider membership at the end of each month. Council members could hold more frequent briefings for members of their regional group, as elected members were said to have a special responsibility for reaching out to non-members. Tempering this view, some felt that, while the Council had a duty to reach out to the wider membership, it could not be everything to everyone.

NGOs, experts and agencies

According to several participants, the Arria formula continued to be a useful way to introduce independent perspectives and fresh information into Security Council deliberations. One speaker highlighted the importance of promoting contact with civil society organizations from around the world, including through Council missions, and not just with those represented in New York. Inputs should not be limited to those from organizations that agree with most of the Council's members.

A full spectrum of views should be heard. Participants felt that it was crucial for the Council to listen and respond to the concerns of other Member States, as well as to those of civil society and other non-governmental actors. However, cautioned one commentator, NGOs should not be allowed to take over agenda-setting for the Council.

Session V
Implementation of the 2005 World Summit Outcome: implications for the Security Council

Moderator:

Ambassador Konstantin K. Dolgov
Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation

Commentators:

Ambassador Alberto D'Alotto
Deputy Permanent Representative of Argentina

Ambassador Augustine P. Mahiga
Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania

The moderator outlined the five principal topics of the session: (i) the Peacebuilding Commission; (ii) counter-terrorism; (iii) Africa; (iv) United Nations reform; and (v) the appointment of the next Secretary-General. At the time of the workshop, negotiations over the Peacebuilding Commission's composition were continuing in the General Assembly. It was hoped that the General Assembly would soon agree on the text of a comprehensive counter-terrorism convention. Implementation of resolution 1625 (2005) on conflict prevention, particularly in Africa, was characterized as challenging. Debate continued on the possible reform and expansion of the Security Council. It was underlined that the choice of the next Secretary-General would be of major importance to the United Nations and its Member States.

Counter-terrorism

One of the commentators emphasized the importance of achieving consensus on a counter-terrorism convention, given recent atrocities in London, Egypt, and Indonesia, and stressed the United Nations place as the natural forum for developing a global counter-terrorism strategy. The Security Council had been active over the previous year in opposing terrorism, while the Secretary-General had provided a useful set of strategies in his March 2005 speech in Madrid. Yet General Assembly negotiations on a comprehensive convention appeared to be stalled over the issue of defining acts of terror. Commending the Council's efforts, another speaker noted that the Council currently had four subsidiary bodies devoted to counter-terrorism. This proliferation of effort, however, now called out for enhanced coordination and coherence of mandates.

Peacebuilding Commission

One of the commentators stressed the importance of the proposed Peacebuilding Commission in global post-conflict recovery efforts, including the

need for inclusion of countries that had experienced conflict and its aftermath. The Security Council would necessarily have an important role to play in the Peacebuilding Commission, both at the organizational and country levels. One speaker recalled that the Commission, as an advisory body, would have to reflect the primacy of the Security Council in matters of peace and security. Another participant noted that Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia and Sierra Leone would be likely candidates for early attention and assistance by the proposed Commission. Peacekeeping operations needed to bolster their peacebuilding capabilities, including in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), security sector reform (SSR), institution-building for civil functions such as human rights and justice, and humanitarian relief. It was suggested that the Security Council might have to create additional subsidiary bodies to relate to the diversity of actors and issues involved in peacebuilding.

Africa

According to several speakers, international attention still needed to be focused on the special needs of the African continent. The Security Council should take into account how assistance, debt and trade decisions made in national capitals could affect the stability and security of African states. The strengthening of the African Union's peacekeeping capacity should remain a long-term priority for the Security Council, as should the immediate task of forging closer linkages with the AU Peace and Security Council. One commentator described resolution 1625 (2005) as a virtual "gold mine" of practical suggestions for conflict prevention in Africa. However, he warned, much needed to be done to implement these ideas.

Appointment of the next Secretary-General

One speaker urged the permanent members to exercise restraint with respect to vetoing promising Secretary-General candidates. He also suggested that candidates from large countries or permanent members should not be excluded from consideration merely on the basis of their nationality. One participant suggested that terms of reference for the position be drawn up, so that Member States could better weigh the merits of various candidates. Another suggested that, in the choice of the candidate, primacy should be given to the region of Asia. A third speaker contended that merit, not geographical rotation, should be the chief criterion for selection of the next Secretary-General, a critical choice at a critical point in the life of the Organization.

Other reform issues

Several participants welcomed the articulation of the principle of the responsibility to protect by heads of state and government at the September 2005 United Nations Summit. This was a major accomplishment, noted one speaker, as there had been considerable trepidation in his region that this principle could be used to rationalize intervention in the guise of protection. It was now understood, however, that the principle of the responsibility to protect was to apply only to the most egregious human rights violations and that non-coercive responses would be considered by the Council before any resort to collective action under Chapter VII.

The question of Security Council reform generated only a handful of general comments. One speaker suggested, however, that the current Security Council was

not sufficiently representative of the membership at large. By his calculations, seven of the Council's current 15 members either were or were aspiring to be part of the Western European and Others Group (WEOG), while members of the much larger non-aligned movement (NAM) occupied only four seats around the Council table. Others suggested that the conversation at the workshop confirmed that any reform of the Council should extend far beyond its composition.

United Nations S/2006/484

Security Council

Distr.: General
5 July 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 28 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you of the attached letter (see annex) signed by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on 26 June 2006.

I should be grateful if you would arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Emyr **Jones Parry**
Permanent Representative

06-41868 (E) 070706

Annex to the letter dated 28 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Joint Letter on Peace and Security between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

1. Within the framework of the new relationship between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the two States reconfirm their desire and commitment to create peaceful and secure relations based upon the principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations, and likewise express their common concern to maintain world peace and security.

2. The United Kingdom and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, working to develop their relations on the basis of mutual respect and sovereign equality, confirm their common duty to cooperate in maintaining international peace and security and to support universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, and to bring to an end all forms of racial discrimination and all types of terrorism and violent religious extremism.

3. The United Kingdom and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya recall their mutual commitment to refrain from organizing, assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorism or acquiescing in organized activities directed towards the commission of such acts.

4. The United Kingdom and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, recalling their joint commitment to reach a settlement of disputes by peaceful means and in a manner that does not endanger justice or international peace and security, will refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of either State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

5. The United Kingdom and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya will work to reach an early settlement of their mutual differences through dialogue and direct negotiation and peaceful and friendly means within the framework of respect for the principle of refraining from interfering in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State and will participate likewise to resolve international disputes in accordance with the principles and aims of international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

6. The United Kingdom and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya recall the United Kingdom's declaration on security assurances attached to the letter dated 6 April 1995 sent by the United Kingdom Permanent Representative to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/50/152-S/1995/262). That declaration reaffirms the intention of the United Kingdom to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

7. Bearing in mind the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 1972 and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction 1993, the United Kingdom confirms that it would seek appropriate action by the Security Council in the event that it determines that the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya is subject to an act of aggression or threat of aggression in which chemical or biological weapons are used.

8. In the context of the aforementioned, and taking into consideration the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's voluntary initiative to dispose of its weapons of mass destruction programmes on 19 December 2003 and so that this initiative might be an example to be emulated by other States, the United Kingdom through its membership of the United Nations Security Council will:

- Provide support, in accordance with any decision of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Charter or relevant conventions, to the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the case that it is the victim of an act of aggression or threat of aggression in which chemical or biological weapons are used;
- Work directly or through the international community to strengthen the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya's defence capabilities so as to ensure that it is able to protect its security and the safety of its national territory from all threats;
- Offer material, specialists and technical assistance necessary to enable the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to transform the programmes it renounced into peaceful programmes; and
- Arrange for this text to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

9. The United Kingdom and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya will work together to make the Mediterranean a region of peace and security and a bridge for civilization and culture. They will promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation and disarmament through adherence to and compliance with international and regional non-proliferation regimes, arms control and disarmament agreements such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and regional arrangements such as establishing a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. They will also urge the States of the Mediterranean to fulfil in good faith their commitments and obligations under those regimes and agreements.

The foregoing record represents the understandings reached between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya upon matters referred to therein.

Signed in duplicate at Tripoli on this 26th day of June 2006 in the English and Arabic languages, both texts having equal validity.

For the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
Dr. Kim Howells
Minister of State

For The Great Socialist People's
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:
Abdullati Obidi
Secretary for European Affairs

United Nations A/60/931–S/2006/485

General Assembly
Security Council

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5 July 2006

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General Assembly
Sixtieth session
Agenda items 14 and 108

Security Council
Sixty-first year

The situation in the Middle East

Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Identical letters dated 5 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I am writing in order to draw your attention to the most recent terrorist attacks perpetrated against the citizens of Israel — the continuous firing of Kassam rocket and mortar shells.

On 4 July 2006, Palestinian terrorists fired a Kassam rocket from the Gaza Strip deep into Israeli territory, landing in a school 12 and a half kilometres away, in the major city of Ashkelon. The Hamas terrorist organization claimed responsibility for the attack.

This Kassam rocket attack represents a serious escalation of the current situation. It was an upgraded Kassam rocket and travelled the farthest distance of any Kassam fired into Israeli territory. It fell in a populated area in the southern part of Ashkelon, causing damage to a school. Children playing near the property were thrown back by the force of the explosion. The school was occupied at the time and it is only by chance that students, teachers and officials were not hurt.

At least six additional Kassam rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip towards Israel on 4 July 2006, three of which landed in the Negev and three landed in Gaza. Between 28 June 2006 and 4 July 2006, Palestinian terrorists launched at least 29 Kassam rockets from the Gaza Strip towards Israel, causing three people to suffer trauma and prompting a large fire. Since Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank in August 2005, Palestinian terrorists have fired more than 630 Kassam rockets towards Israel.

I submit the present letter in follow-up to numerous letters detailing the campaign of Palestinian terrorism launched in September 2000, which document the crimes for which the terrorists and their supporters must be held fully accountable.

06-41787 (E) 060706

I would be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter circulated as a document of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly, under agenda items 14 and 108. An identical letter has been submitted to Jean-Marc de La Sablière, President of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dan **Gillerman**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2006/486

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 July 2006

Original: English

Letter dated 29 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to draw your attention to the statement on the agreement reached between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Union of Islamic Courts, issued on 27 June 2006 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union (see annex).

I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gerhard **Pfanzelter**
Permanent Representative of Austria
to the United Nations

06-41876 (E) 070706

Annex to the letter dated 29 June 2006 from the Permanent Representative of Austria to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English, French and Spanish]

Statement on the agreement reached between the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and the Union of Islamic Courts, issued on 27 June 2006 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union

The European Union welcomes the agreement reached in Khartoum on 22 June 2006 establishing a basis for negotiations between the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts, and congratulates both the League of Arab States and the Sudanese Government for facilitating the talks.

The European Union urges the Transitional Federal Institutions and the Union of Islamic Courts to sincerely and urgently implement this agreement by engaging in meaningful dialogue in pursuit of a political solution, so that peace and stability can return to Somalia, in the interest of the Somali civilian population.

The European Union calls on all regional and international partners to create and maintain the conditions necessary for the dialogue and to continue to support the dialogue within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter.

The European Union reaffirms its readiness to provide political and material support to this process as necessary and appropriate.

The acceding countries Bulgaria and Romania, the candidate countries Turkey, Croatia* and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,* the countries of the stabilization and association process and potential candidates Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine align themselves with this statement.

* Croatia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia continue to be part of the stabilization and association process.

United Nations S/2006/487

Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in that country

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1233 (1999), by which the Council requested me to keep it regularly informed and to submit a report on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNOGBIS). Subsequently, in paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 1580 (2004), the Council requested me to submit a written report to it every three months.

2. The present report focuses on developments since my last report, dated 14 March 2006 (S/2006/162), in particular the slow progress in the reconciliation process and the political impact of the socio-economic hardships resulting from salary arrears in the public sector and a poor cashew export season.

II. Political developments

3. During the period under review, the political climate continued to be fundamentally marked by deep antagonisms, mistrust and intolerance among key actors, against the backdrop of weak State institutions and acute economic and social crisis. Although the National Popular Assembly (ANP) approved the Government's 2006 work programme on 16 March 2006, it has yet to discuss the 2006 budget proposal at its fourth session, to be convened from 26 June to 26 July 2006.

4. The fragility of the political situation in the country was vividly demonstrated by controversy and bitter tensions over military operations launched by Guinea-Bissau armed forces against a faction of the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC) on 14 March 2006, which prompted heated debates in Parliament and resulted in a grave humanitarian crisis. According to official sources, the operations aimed at protecting national sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as protecting civilians against the actions of MFDC rebels. However, some ANP members, leaders of political parties, civil society organizations and the media questioned the wisdom of the military intervention in view of the financial and economic difficulties faced by the country. My Representative, João Bernardo Honwana, and the representatives of the Economic Community of West African

06-40584 (E) 110706

States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries called on relevant national actors to endeavour to contain and reverse the situation without delay and to find negotiated solutions to the crisis, both in its political and military dimensions.

5. In late March, President João Bernardo Vieira initiated a series of consultations with key national actors on ways to address the political and socio-economic challenges facing the country. He met with the Council of State, leaders of the main State institutions, political parties represented in Parliament, the military hierarchy, the President of the Bar Association, the President of the Supreme Court of Justice and women's groups. After those meetings, expectations arose that this process could lead to sustainable political dialogue that would allow the State to function more effectively and break the political deadlock that followed the presidential elections and the dismissal of the government of the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde in October 2005.

6. Another encouraging factor is the continued strong commitment of civil society actors to constructive dialogue and the reconciliation process, as evidenced by the "Estados Gerais" initiative. Launched on 7 March 2006 by a group of citizens, under the joint auspices of UNOGBIS, ECOWAS and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, "Estados Gerais" is a dialogue initiative aimed at creating a space for consensus-building on the sources of instability and root causes of conflict, which has been endorsed by President Vieira, who identified it as a useful instrument for the reconciliation of all Bissau Guineans.

7. From 2 to 5 May 2006, an ECOWAS high-level delegation visited Bissau to assess the political, military, humanitarian and socio-economic situation and devise ways in which the organization can best assist through its conflict prevention mechanism. The findings of the delegation were presented to the meeting of ECOWAS Ministers for Foreign Affairs held in Monrovia on 15 May, which, among other things, discussed the ECOWAS proposal to establish a contact group on Guinea-Bissau whose main objective would be to harmonize international strategies in support of Guinea-Bissau and to mobilize resources for peacebuilding and reconstruction in that country.

III. Economic and social aspects

8. The socio-economic and financial situation in Guinea-Bissau, one of the most indebted poverty-stricken countries under the heavily indebted poor countries initiative, remains difficult as the Government is unable to even cover costs related to the minimum functioning of the State and continues to accumulate external debt service arrears to most creditors. The projected financial gap of the national budget for 2006 amounts to €90 million.

9. From 16 to 30 March 2006, an International Monetary Fund (IMF) mission visited Bissau to assess the Government's performance under the 2005 staff-monitored programme, to conduct the article IV consultations and to negotiate a new staff-monitored programme for 2006. The mission reached an agreement on a staff-monitored programme for the period from April to December 2006, which helped the Government obtain €6 million in direct budget support from the European Union (EU). A follow-up mission took place from 19 to 20 June, which identified areas of concern in the implementation of the agreements reached in

March. If these concerns are effectively addressed, and the objectives of enhanced political stability, improved governance and the promotion of healthy economic and financial policies are realized, the conditions will be in place for convening a donors round-table conference before the end of 2006, which, in turn, could lead to an emergency post-conflict assistance package from the IMF. Within the framework of the staff-monitored programme for 2006, $10 million from the World Bank is expected for general budget support. In addition, the World Bank will negotiate a $15 million project proposal for multisector infrastructure rehabilitation.

10. On 6 and 7 June 2006, the President met with representatives of trade unions and employers' organizations to discuss the social tensions arising from salary arrears and the ever-increasing cost of living, as well as the cashew nut export problem. The President offered to mediate the dispute with the Government over working hours. At an extraordinary meeting on 9 June, the Council of Ministers issued a decree establishing the return to the previous schedule of the one-period working day for the public sector during the rainy season, from 12 June to 31 October 2006.

11. This year, the commercialization of cashew nuts, the country's top export, has been seriously affected by a 30 per cent increase in the reference price established by the Government. With the buyers waiting for the price to drop, and the onset of the rainy season, the cashew nut-rice exchange is not taking place and food stocks are at a low point. This prompted the Government to appeal for a response to a "food crisis" in the southern part of the country. According to Government sources, by mid-June only 8,000 tons of unprocessed cashew nuts had been shipped from the port of Bissau, in contrast with about 50,000 tons exported at the same time last year.

12. Given disastrous socio-economic conditions in Guinea-Bissau, which are threatening to complicate further the already fragile political and security situation, Nigeria and the ECOWAS secretariat indicated that they would offer an emergency financial package to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in the total amount of $4 million ($2.5 million from Nigeria and $1.5 million from ECOWAS) to help pay salary arrears.

13. The World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) supported the Ministry of Health in undertaking the first national measles campaign from 15 to 29 May 2006. The campaign aimed at vaccinating all children between the ages of six months and 15 years, and a coverage rate of 82 per cent was achieved. In April, WHO further supported a yellow fever vaccination campaign in the border region of Gabu for children under the age of five.

14. The military operations referred to in paragraph 4 of the present report resulted in the displacement of about 10,000 people (internally displaced persons (IDPs)), mostly women and children, and isolated some 20,000 people from farming and fishing communities, while landmines and improvised explosive devices were reportedly planted in the disputed area by MFDC forces. In spite of the end of hostilities, the conditions in the affected villages are not yet conducive to the definite return of IDPs, mainly owing to mine risks and the destruction of and damage to their property during the clashes. Mine contamination has a particularly negative impact on the economic performance of the country since it prevents the harvest of cashew nuts in many areas in the northern region.

15. The United Nations, in collaboration with civil society organizations, provided assistance from existing contingency and regular resources, with the World Food Programme, UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Population Fund and WHO distributing food and non-food items to affected populations. The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) played a key role in coordinating the response of the United Nations country team and partners and in the preparation of resource mobilization requests. The United Nations agencies have submitted a $1.5 million request to the Central Emergency Response Fund to finance a plan to address the urgent needs of the affected population. The Central Emergency Response Fund and the flash appeal would allow Guinea-Bissau to cover humanitarian assistance for six months.

IV. Military and security aspects

16. As mentioned in paragraph 4 above, on 14 March 2006 the Bissau-Guinean armed forces launched a military operation against an MFDC faction led by Salif Sadio, near the border with Senegal. The military authorities declared the operation successfully concluded on 22 April and stated that Salif Sadio's camps within the national territory had been dismantled and his fighters expelled beyond the national borders. No official estimate of casualties was made public.

17. With United Nations Mine Action Service and Central Emergency Response Fund assistance, mine risk education and sensitization, as well as mine survey and identification, have begun in the areas in the northern part of the country affected by the recent clashes. The work is being implemented by the UNDP-supported National Mine Action Coordination Centre and field demining operations are under way. In the capital of Bissau, the removal of unexploded ordnance continues, and it is likely that Bissau will be declared mine-free by the end of July 2006.

18. UNOGBIS has continued to play a critical advisory role in support to national efforts in the domain of security sector reform. However, conflicting schedules and salary arrears have hampered progress in the security sector review process and the drafting of a national security sector reform strategy document. Both exercises will follow a template developed with the assistance of the United Kingdom Security Sector Development Advisory Team, which visited the country in October 2005 and February and March 2006.

19. The two previous Advisory Team visits to Bissau were instrumental to the progress currently being made in the security sector reform process, both in terms of enhancing the capacity of UNOGBIS to play its facilitator role and the extremely valuable advice given to Bissau-Guinean officials, especially those responsible for the review process and the drafting of the national security sector reform strategy document. A third visit by the Advisory Team to Guinea-Bissau is planned later this year to assist Guinea-Bissau officials with the conclusion of the review process and the finalization of the strategy document. Brazil has also remained engaged in assisting with military restructuring, having provided an additional contribution of €205,900 on behalf of the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries to the UNDP-managed trust fund.

20. From 2 to 5 May 2006, UNOGBIS participated in a workshop on small arms and light weapons organized by the Canadian International Development Agency, as

a way to ensure harmonization among the different initiatives, including an integrated plan of action on small arms and light weapons.

V. Human rights aspects

21. The media coverage of the military operations in the northern part of the country underscored the need for additional efforts aimed at consolidating a responsible and free press and preventing tendencies to manipulate the media to score political points. To strengthen the capacity of Bissau-Guinean media to play a constructive role in the overall peacebuilding process, UNOGBIS has elaborated a programme of training courses, workshops on conflict transformation and reconciliation and other sensitization activities, which began with a training course for 18 journalists from State and private print and radio, as well as the State-owned television and news agency, from 5 to 9 June. The course covered basic journalistic skills such as interviewing techniques, coverage of press conferences, ethics and editorial principles, and the partnership between the United Nations and the media.

22. To increase awareness of the need to respect human rights and the role of the police in defending the welfare of civilians, on 1 and 2 June 2006, UNOGBIS organized two seminars for a total of 127 police officers in the regions of Bafata and Gabú. The seminars focused on ethics, national and international police legislation, and the use of force and firearms and their impact on society.

23. Gender mainstreaming remains high on the UNOGBIS agenda, especially in the police sector, where there is a lack of legislation on domestic violence and intervention or preventive measures in this regard.

24. Further to its follow-up visit from 23 February to 2 March 2006, the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime has formulated a strategic programme framework for Guinea-Bissau, as a contribution to the security sector reform process and to rehabilitate some of the existing detention centres. Together with officials from the office of the Attorney-General, UNOGBIS has continued to monitor the conditions of detainees in order to ensure that they benefit from judicial guarantees. UNOGBIS and WHO are collaborating in an effort to find a sustainable solution to the lack of medical services in the detention centres.

VI. Observations and recommendations

25. Once again, the situation in Guinea-Bissau presents limited progress in the consolidation of peace and stability. The slow pace of the country's reconciliation process delays not only political normalization but also the restoration of donors' confidence, without which the resumption of the critically needed flow of international assistance to the country cannot be guaranteed.

26. I welcome the important steps taken by President Vieira to launch a constructive dialogue with the organs of the State, political parties, business, trade unions, civil society and other social partners, which raise hopes that institutional stability can be achieved. I also welcome civil society reconciliation initiatives, whose momentum increases the prospects of sustainable peace.

27. I deplore the loss of lives, the displacement of populations and the political tensions felt in the capital city of Bissau in the wake of the operations in the north. The end of hostilities is encouraging, but it is now essential to enable the displaced population and refugees to safely return to their homes and livelihoods. In this regard, I would like to call on the international community to respond positively to the flash appeal under way. It is equally important to find comprehensive and durable solutions to the complex causes of the crisis, which require joint efforts by all States affected by the Casamance question, namely Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and the Gambia.

28. The severity of the challenges confronting Guinea-Bissau allows no room for complacency. However, complex and difficult as it is, the situation is not intractable. It simply requires key national stakeholders to recognize the crucial nexus among political stability, security and development. They must also recognize their sovereign responsibilities and find political will to resolve their differences constructively, to build the peace through vigorously pursuing reconciliation and reconstruction. Nobody can replace the country's leadership in those endeavours.

29. Preventing, managing and resolving conflict to consolidate the peace is a large-scale process of change that is neither linear nor short-term. It is normally marked by progress, regression and, sometimes, even collapse. The frustration of the international community at this uneven evolution is understandable, but we must persevere and stay the course. Fostering an enabling environment for positive transformation requires a crucial addition to national efforts and political will — the engagement of the international community.

30. In that regard, I wish to commend the continued commitment of Guinea-Bissau's partners. I call on States and institutions to seek innovative ways to help the country organize and conduct the dialogue and reconciliation process, ensure better coordination and harmonization of socio-economic and financial assistance packages, engage more vigorously in the preparations for the donor round table on Guinea-Bissau later this year and further assist in the security sector reform process.

31. In that connection, I encourage the Government to cooperate fully with IMF and urgently address the obstacles to progress with the security sector reform process, so as to pave the way for the resumption of preparations for the donor round table.

32. I am particularly pleased with the close cooperation among UNOGBIS, the Community of Portugese-Speaking Countries and ECOWAS, which has ensured an integrated approach to peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau. The synergies and complementarities developed thus far have played a key role in promoting the dialogue among the institutions of the State, generating the momentum around civil society reconciliation initiatives, and fostering the security sector reform process. I am also encouraged by the continuous collaboration between UNOGBIS and the United Nations country team.

33. A mission dispatched by the Department of Political Affairs to Guinea-Bissau from 22 to 27 May 2006 reported to me that the political and socio-economic challenges confronting the country continue to constitute an obstacle to the full recovery from the consequences of the 1998/1999 conflict, with many social indicators being even lower than before that conflict. The mission also reported that its interlocutors inside and outside the country considered the lack of financial

resources as a critical factor impeding the Government's post-conflict recovery efforts. They underscored the nexus between the lack of resources and instability or absence of peace and security. In that regard, I am pleased to say that the mission's interlocutors expressed strong appreciation for the positive and constructive role played by UNOGBIS in the stabilization of Guinea-Bissau. I shall revert to the Council with recommendations on the role of UNOGBIS in the immediate future and beyond.

34. Finally, I wish to acknowledge the contribution of my Representative, João Bernardo Honwana, the staff of UNOGBIS, and the entire United Nations country team to consolidation of peace in Guinea-Bissau.

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